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Foreword 
The third consultative paper (CP3) on the proposed new Basel Capital Accord 
(Basel II), issued in late April by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
addresses the use of risk mitigants such as guarantees, collateral, and derivatives to 
reduce regulatory capital charges on risk exposures.  The U.S. regulatory agencies will 
publish an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) in July to seek comment on 
how they should apply Basel II in the United States.  Some U.S. bankers and trade 
associations have already indicated that they believe that the CP3 proposal does not 
adequately deal with the reduction in credit risk associated with credit guarantees.  They 
point out that both a borrower and a guarantor would have to default (“double default”) 
for losses to be incurred on a hedged credit exposure.  Supervisors, on the other hand, 
have suggested that providing greater capital relief for exposures hedged using credit 
guarantees might be imprudent at this time because of risk concentrations among 
protection providers, limited experience in evaluating the risk-mitigating effects 
associated with guarantees, and practical constraints on supervisors' ability to properly 
monitor those banks that make extensive use of credit guarantees.   
This Federal Reserve staff White Paper analyzes these issues in an effort to focus 
the comments of bankers and other interested parties regarding the forthcoming ANPR.  
It is being released now to provide time for commenters to develop their positions and 
gather data.  Analysis and evidence that addresses the concerns of supervisors would be 
particularly helpful. 
Commenters should feel free to contact directly the principal researcher on this 
paper, Erik Heitfield, to discuss the paper and the issues raised.  To discuss matters 
specifically related to bank supervision commenters should contact Norah Barger.  Their 
contact information is on the cover page.  However, comments on the ANPR should be 
sent before the end of the comment period to the addresses given in that document. 
 
Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. 
Vice Chairman 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1 
1. Introduction 
Under proposed rules for the new Basel capital accord (Basel II), an Advanced 
Internal-Ratings-Based (A-IRB) bank that purchases credit protection from a qualifying 
third-party guarantor is permitted to use the probability of default (PD) and loss given 
default (LGD) associated with the guarantor in assessing regulatory capital charges for 
the exposure.  Some industry representatives have argued that this treatment is too 
conservative because it fails to account for the fact that both an obligor and a guarantor 
must default for a bank to incur a loss on a hedged credit exposure.  On the other hand, 
bank supervisors are concerned that providing greater capital relief under Pillar I for 
exposures hedged using credit guarantees might be imprudent because of the current state 
of development of risk management practices and because of practical constraints on 
supervisors' ability to properly monitor banks that rely heavily on guarantees to mitigate 
credit risk.   
This paper presents staff research on how a more nuanced Pillar I treatment of 
credit guarantees might be structured.  This research is exploratory and should not be 
taken to represent a firm proposal for modifying the way Basel II handles credit 
guarantees.  It is presented at this early stage with the hope that it will stimulate useful 
and focused feedback from interested parties.  To that end, the document at many points 
makes explicit requests for comment on topics of particular concern. 
Parties can mutually transfer risk through a variety of contractual mechanisms 
including traditional financial guarantees, credit default swaps, total return swaps, and 
credit-linked notes.  A simple credit guarantee contract is illustrated in figure 1 (next 
page). Under this arrangement a bank makes a loan to a reference obligor and obtains 
protection against default losses associated with that loan.  In some cases, the obligor 
pays a guarantor for credit enhancement, which typically is integral to the lending 
decision.  In others, such as with credit default swaps (CDSs), the bank purchases credit 
protection independently from the borrower.  In either case, in exchange for a fee the 
guarantor agrees to pay the bank principal and interest losses in the event that the 
reference obligor defaults.2 
  Section 2 of this paper examines the theoretical arguments in favor of increasing 
the amount of capital relief granted under Pillar I for hedged exposures.  We see two 
main benefits from hedging exposures using credit guarantees.  First, if a bank hedges the 
credit risk for an exposure, it will incur losses only if both the reference obligor and the 
guarantor default simultaneously.  In general, the joint probability that both 
counterparties default together is substantially lower than either counterparty's individual 
default probability.  A simple example illustrates this point.  Suppose we flip a fair coin 
once; the probability that it will come up heads is 50 percent.  If we flip two coins, the 
probability that both will come up heads is only 25 percent.  Thus, the joint event that 
both coins show heads is only half as likely as the event that a single coin shows heads.  
Things become more complicated when we think about the joint event that both an 
obligor and a guarantor will default because these events may not be independent, but the 
essential logic is the same. Thus, although the bank may receive a benefit from the fact 
that the guarantor may have a lower default probability than the obligor, it receives an 

















by bank 3 
even greater benefit from the fact that the simultaneous default of both counterparties 
carries a lower probability than does the separate default of either.  The difference 
between individual and joint default probabilities lies at the core of what has come to be 
called the “double default” effect. 
A second potential benefit from buying credit protection is that if both the 
reference obligor and the guarantor default the bank may be able to pursue recoveries 
from both counterparties.  Many guarantee arrangements require the bank to give up its 
claim on the reference obligor in order to collect on the guarantee.  Thus, if both the 
borrower and the guarantor default the bank must choose to pursue claims against one 
party or the other. However, in a typical CDS contract the bank can retain the right to 
seek recoveries from the reference obligor while also pursuing recoveries from the 
protection seller.  In this case the protection seller will owe the bank par minus the 
market value of the defaulted reference obligation. For example, if a bank makes a $100 
loan to an obligor and the loan facility has a stress LGD of 50 percent, the bank can 
expect to recover $50 from that obligor in the event it defaults.  Now suppose the bank 
also purchased a CDS for $100 on a reference asset of the obligor and assume exposures 
to the protection seller have LGDs of 50 percent. If the guarantor defaults the bank can 
pursue a claim against it for par less the market value of the reference asset.  If the market 
value of that asset were $50 (that is, the LGD of the asset were the same as the loan 
facility), the bank would have a $50 claim against the guarantor, of which it would 
recover $25.  Thus, the bank would expect to recover 75 percent of its $100 exposure: 50 
percent from the obligor, and half of the remaining 50 percent from the guarantor.  For 
lack of a better term, we will call this ability to collect from two counterparties the 
"double recovery” effect. 
The substitution approach proposed in the Basel Committee's third consultative 
paper (CP3) incorporates neither double-default nor double-recovery effects (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003).  Their omission is no accident; paragraph 270 
of CP3 states that “credit risk mitigation in the form of credit derivatives and guarantees 
must not reflect the effects of double default.” In comment letters, the International 
Swaps and Dealers Association (ISDA) argued that excluding double-default effects is 4 
excessively conservative, and would discourage banks from using guarantees to mitigate 
credit risk (ISDA, 2002, 2001). 
Section 3 of this paper presents a framework for assessing Pillar I capital charges 
on hedged exposures that explicitly recognizes both double-default and double-recovery 
effects.  This approach would map PDs and LGDs for obligors and guarantors into capital 
charges for hedged exposures using a risk-weight formula similar to that currently used to 
map PDs and LGDs for obligors into A-IRB capital requirements for unhedged 
exposures.  We call this the ASRF approach because it incorporates the same “asymptotic 
single risk factor” assumptions used to derive Pillar I capital charges for unhedged 
exposures. 
As with the current A-IRB risk-weight functions, the ASRF framework for 
handling hedged exposures would require that the Basel Committee specify key 
parameters that describe the extent to which the risks faced by different counterparties are 
correlated with one another.  Very little data is available for the calibration of these 
parameters, so industry comment on how these parameters should be chosen would be 
particularly helpful.  Section 4 of this paper shows how different assumptions about 
“wrong way” risk between reference obligors and guarantors and about the exposure of 
guarantors to systematic risk affect ASRF capital requirements for hedged exposures. 
Sections 2 through 4 focus exclusively on the treatment of hedged exposures 
under Pillar I.  However, greater Pillar I recognition for credit guarantees could clearly 
have important implications for Pillar II, the supervisory component of Basel II.  The 
theoretical justification for recognizing double-default and double-recovery effects could 
be applied to a broad range of financial transactions with varying degrees of wrong-way 
risk.  Hence, any recognition of these effects would necessarily require that supervisors 
make judgments about what types of financial transactions would be covered.  More 
generally, supervisors are concerned that in some circumstances a regulatory capital 
framework that recognized double-default and double-recovery effects could overstate 
the level of credit protection that guarantees provide.  Because credit guarantees are 
commonly used by banks to reduce concentrations to large counterparties, granting 
substantial capital relief for hedged exposures under Pillar I could also require a more 5 
vigilant accounting of portfolio concentrations risk under Pillar II.  These supervisory 
concerns are discussed in detail in section 5. 
Section 6 seeks comment on whether existing markets for credit derivatives and 
best-practice risk management systems are sufficiently developed to ensure that credit 
guarantees can supply the degree of risk mitigation that theoretical arguments imply.  
Though the credit derivatives market has grown rapidly over the last several years, it is 
still nascent.  Only a few dealers are involved in a high proportion of credit derivatives 
transactions, and the staff is aware of no evidence on the extent to which double-default 
and double-recovery effects are incorporated into market prices for hedged debt. 
The main conclusions of this paper are presented in section 7.  We find that when 
only credit risk is considered, double-default and double-recovery effects can have a 
significant impact on regulatory capital charges.  Explicit recognition of these effects 
under Pillar I would therefore seem warranted.  However, the magnitudes of double-
default and double-recovery effects depend on a number of economic drivers about which 
relatively little data are available.  Moreover, fully recognizing these effects would likely 
lead to significant reductions in Pillar I capital charges for hedged exposures, so the 
implications of such recognition for other aspects of Basel II need to be carefully 
evaluated.  Section 7 identifies a number of areas where input from industry commenters 
would be particularly valuable in helping regulators to craft rules for dealing with hedged 
credit exposures. 
2.  Double-Default and Double-Recovery Effects 
If a bank uses a credit guarantee to hedge the credit risk associated with a loan, it 
will incur a loss only if both the obligor and the guarantor default at the same time.
1  In 
general such joint default events are much less likely than individual default events, even 
when the underlying asset values of the two counterparties are relatively highly 
correlated.  Table 1 (next page) illustrates this point.  It reports joint default probabilities 
                                                 
1 Throughout this analysis “loss” is defined narrowly as the loss associated with a default event.  Mark-to-
market losses can occur for a hedged exposure when either the guarantor or the reference obligor 
experiences a decline in credit quality. 6 




Table 1: Joint default probabilities under low, medium, and high obligor–guarantor asset-









PD  0.030 0.100 0.500 1.000 2.000 5.000 10.000 50.000
0.030 0.000  0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005  0.008  0.022 
0.100 0.000  0.001 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.014  0.023  0.072 
0.500 0.001  0.003 00.11 0.019 0.031 0.060  0.102  0.340 
Low 
(ρ irb) 
1.000 0.002  0.005 0.019 0.033 0.055 0.108  0.188  0.659 
0.030 0.001  0.002 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.018  0.022  0.030 
0.100 0.002  0.005 0.015 0.023 0.034 0.052  0.068  0.097 
0.500 0.006  0.015 0.050 0.079 0.122 0.205  0.287  0.475 
Medium 
(0.50) 
1.000 0.009  0.023 0.079 0.129 0.206 0.361  0.523  0.935 
0.030 0.005  0.009 0.018 0.022 0.026 0.028  0.030  0.030 
0.100 0,009  0.021 0.047 0.061 0.075 0.090  0.097  0.100 
0.500 0.018  0.047 0.139 0.204 0.281 0.387  0.450  0.500 
High 
(0.75) 
1.000 0.022  0.061 0.204 0.317 0.465 0.691  0.848  0.998 
 
 
The “low” asset-correlation case assumes that the correlation between the assets 
of the obligor and those of the guarantor is equal to the assumed asset correlation used in 
the A-IRB C&I risk-weight function proposed in CP3 (paragraph 242).  This asset 
correlation ranges from 12 percent for high-PD obligors, to 24 percent for low-PD 
obligors.  Throughout this paper, we use ρ irb to denote the C&I asset-correlation function 
given in CP3.
3  
Increasing the correlation between the assets of the obligor and the assets of the 
guarantor has the effect of increasing the two counterparties' joint default probability.  
                                                 
2 In the asymptotic-single-risk-factor framework that serves as the foundation for the Basel II risk weight 
functions, there is a one-to-one relationship between asset correlations and default correlations.  Asset 
correlations are a more natural metric for measuring dependencies in obligor credit quality because assets 
can take on a continuum of values, whereas defaults are discrete events. Thus, in keeping with previous 
research, this analysis uses asset correlations to model cross-obligor dependencies, rather than modeling 
default correlations directly.   
3 The CP3 asset correlation function r(PD) is only strictly defined for a single counterparty.   In this 
analysis when referring to obligor-guarantor asset correlations, we use ρ irb = [r(PDo)r(PDg)]
1/2 where PDo is 
the PD of the obligor and PDg is the PD of the guarantor. 7 
This effect can be seen by comparing the joint default probabilities reported for the “low” 
obligor–guarantor asset-correlation case with those reported for the “medium” and “high” 
cases, which assume asset correlations of 50 percent and 75 percent respectively.  Even in 
the case of high asset correlation the joint default probabilities are generally much lower 
than either counterparty's marginal default probability.  However, double-default effects 
are attenuated when the asset correlation and the obligor PD are both relatively high. 
An extreme case, not shown in the table, occurs when the obligor–guarantor asset 
correlation is equal to 100 percent so that the assets of the two counterparties move in 
lock-step with one another.  Perfect asset correlation implies that whenever the lower PD 
counterparty defaults, the higher PD counterparty defaults as well.  In this situation the 
joint default probability is simply equal to the minimum of the two counterparties' 
marginal default probabilities.  This is the assumption implicit in the substitution 
approach to assessing capital for hedged exposures proposed in CP3. 
 Depending on the particularities of the contract, a credit guarantee may lead to 
lower losses in the event that both the obligor and the guarantor default.  Such “double 
recovery” effects arise in circumstances where a lender has legal recourse to pursue 
recoveries from both a reference obligor and a guarantor.  In theory, in these cases the 
loss given default (LGD) for a hedged exposure should be equal to the product of the 
stress LGDs for comparable unhedged exposures to the reference obligor and the 
protection seller.  It is important to recognize, however, that double-recovery effects are 
not a feature of all credit guarantee arrangements since many contracts specify that legal 
claims against the reference obligor transfer to the guarantor in the event that the obligor 
defaults. Further, the extent to which double recoveries can be viewed as simply 
multiplicative is affected by many factors, including differences between the hedged loan 
and the reference asset and differences between creditor and market expectations 
regarding the value of a claim against the reference obligor.  As an analytical matter, one 
can abstract from double-recovery effects by assuming that the LGD associated with one 
of the two counterparties is 100 percent.
4   
                                                 
4 LGDs are associated with facilities, not obligors.  In this analysis we use the term “obligor LGD” to refer 
to the loss given default for an unhedged exposure to the reference obligor.  The term “guarantor LGD” 
refers to the loss given default associated with an unhedged exposure to the protection provider. 8 
Under the substitution approach proposed in CP3, the lowest risk weight that can 
be used for a hedged exposure is the lesser of the risk weights associated with unhedged 
exposures to the reference obligor and the guarantor.  In other words, a bank would be 
allowed to calculate capital for a hedged exposure by using either the PD and LGD of the 
guarantor or the PD and LGD of the obligor in the CP3 risk-weight function for 
unhedged exposures. As is shown in the appendix, this algorithm is consistent with Basel 
II's capital treatment for unhedged exposures if one assumes that (1) the assets of the 
obligor and the guarantor are perfectly correlated, and (2) the LGD of the higher PD 
counterparty is 100 percent.  Thus, it does not recognize either double-default or double-
recovery effects.  
Table 2 (below) reports capital charges derived from the substitution approach.  
All capital calculations presented in this paper assume a one-year maturity loan and an 
obligor LGD of 45 percent.  Capital charges are expressed as percentages of the loan 
exposure at default and are reported for a range of obligor and guarantor PDs.   Two 
guarantor LGD parameters are considered: 100 percent and 45 percent.  The former 
abstracts from possible double-recovery effects; the latter permits very substantial 
double-recovery effects in those capital models that recognize them. 
 
Table 2: Substitution approach capital charges.  Shading indicates that the substitution 
approach produces no reduction in regulatory capital. 
 
Obligor LGD = 45  Guarantor 
Obligor PD 
LGD PD  0.03  0.10  0.50  1.00  2.00 5.00 10.00 50.00 
0.03  0.62  1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38  1.38  1.38  1.38 
0.10  0.62  1.54  3.42 3.42 3.42  3.42  3.42  3.42 
0.50  0.62  1.54  4.40  6.31  8.56  9.77 9.77  9.77 
100 
1.00  0.62  1.54  4.40  6.31  8.56  12.80  14.03 14.03 
0.03  0.62  0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62  0.62  0.62  0.62 
0.10  0.62  1.54  1.54 1.54 1.54  1.54  1.54  1.54 
0.50  0.62  1.54  4.40  4.40 4.40  4.40  4.40 4.40 
45 
1.00  0.62  1.54  4.40  6.31  6.31 6.31 6.31  6.31 
 
 
In table 2 shaded cells indicate PD/LGD combinations for which the substitution 
approach generates exactly the same capital charge as that that would be applied to an 9 
unhedged exposure.  Stated differently, in the shaded cells a bank would choose to use 
the risk weight for an exposure to the reference obligor, not the risk weight for an 
exposure to the guarantor.  The substitution approach provides no capital relief when the 
PD of the guarantor is greater than or equal to that of the reference obligors.  As can be 
seen in the first four rows of table 2, when the LGD of the guarantor is high the 
substitution approach provides capital relief for a smaller range of obligor and guarantor 
PDs. The absence of any capital relief for hedging certain exposures is a sharp contrast to 
the current capital rules (Basel I). Under Basel I, the substitution approach yields 
substantial capital relief for all non-financial obligors, regardless of PD.
5  
The substitution approach has been criticized by some bankers and derivatives 
dealers because it does not recognize double-default effects.  Though the credit 
derivatives market has grown rapidly in recent years, they argue that failing to recognize 
double-default effects could hinder future growth by discouraging banks from using 
guarantees to hedge credit risk.  They also assert that the substitution approach runs 
counter to the Basel Committee’s stated objective of aligning regulatory and economic 
capital requirements.  To deal with double-default effects, ISDA has proposed that a 
“haircut” be applied to the smaller of the obligor and guarantor PDs and that this 
“shaved” PD be used in calculating capital for hedged exposures (ISDA, 2001).  Table 3 
(next page) reports capital charges derived from ISDA's PD haircut approach.
6  
Comparing tables 3 and 2 shows that, relative to the substitution approach, ISDA’s PD 
haircut approach would lead to roughly a one-third reduction in regulatory capital 
charges. 
                                                 
5 Under Basel I rules, an exposure with an associated guarantee generally receives a risk weight of 20 
percent rather than 100 percent. 
6 ISDA’s proposal is not explicit concerning whether obligor or guarantor LGD parameters should be used 
in calculating regulatory capital charges.  The charges reported in table 2 were derived by first applying 
ISDA’s proposed PD haircut to the PDs of the reference obligor and the guarantor and then calculating 
capital charges for unhedged exposures to both counterparties. The lesser of these two capital charges is 
reported.     10 
 
Table 3: ISDA “haircut” capital charges. 
 
Obligor LGD = 45  Guarantor 
Obligor PD 
LGD PD  0.03  0.10  0.50  1.00  2.00 5.00 10.00 50.00 
0.03 0.35  1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04  1.04  1.04 1.04 
0.10 0.47  0.91 2.01 2.01 2.01  2.01  2.01 2.01 
0.50 0.47  0.91 2.70 3.93 5.40  5.99  5.99 5.99 
100 
1.00 0.47  0.91 2.70 3.93 5.40  8.19  8.74 8.74 
0.03 0.35  0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47  0.47  0.47 0.47 
0.10 0.47  0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91  0.91  0.91 0.91 
0.50 0.47  0.91 2.70 2.70 2.70  2.70  2.70 2.70 
45 
1.00 0.47  0.91 2.70 3.93 3.93  3.93  3.93 3.93 
 
 
ISDA’s proposed approach is a simple and intuitive way to retain an incentive in 
favor of hedging credit risk in Basel II. However, ISDA’s ad hoc approach is analytically 
inconsistent with the framework underlying Basel II's treatment of credit risk for 
unhedged exposures, which sets capital on individual exposures to achieve a portfolio-
wide solvency target.  Section 3 of this paper describes an analytical approach to 
incorporating double-default and double-recovery effects derived from the same single 
risk factor Merton model used to derive capital charges for unhedged exposures under 
Pillar I.  As we shall see, this more rigorous approach can produce capital charges that 
look different from those generated by either the substitution approach or ISDA's haircut 
approach. 
3.  An ASRF Capital Model for Hedged Exposures 
Under the Asymptotic-Single-Risk-Factor (ASRF) framework that serves as the 
theoretical foundation for A-IRB capital requirements, the capital charge for an 
individual exposure is derived by calculating its conditional expected loss function, given 
an adverse draw of a single systematic risk factor.  The systematic risk factor captures the 
macroeconomic component of credit risk that drives correlations in defaults across 
exposures.  Gordy (2002) shows that under particular assumptions, the ASRF framework 
yields capital charges that will satisfy a portfolio-level solvency target. 11 
To apply the ASRF framework to a hedged exposure, one must calculate the 
conditional probability that both the obligor and the guarantor default, given a realization 
of the systematic risk factor.  This is quite a different calculation from the PD haircut 
approach proposed by ISDA that was discussed in section 2 of this paper.  The appendix 
shows how a Merton-style credit risk model similar to that underlying the A-IRB risk-
weight functions for unhedged exposures can be used to derive conditional joint default 
probabilities for hedged exposures. This model generalizes the one-factor Merton model 
by introducing a separate risk factor that affects only the obligor and the guarantor. 
Because this extra risk factor does not influence other exposures in the bank portfolio, it 
does not violate the ASRF assumptions.
7 However, it allows for the possibility that an 
obligor and guarantor may have more in common than a corresponding pair of unrelated 
obligors.  
The advanced IRB risk-weight function for an unhedged exposure depends on an 
obligor's PD, an LGD, and an asset-correlation parameter. The asset-correlation 
parameter measures the importance of systematic risk in determining whether the obligor 
will default.  Since regulatory capital is held to cover those unexpected portfolio losses 
that arise when obligors default in clusters, all else equal, the higher an obligor's asset 
correlation the higher will be its regulatory capital charge. When calculating capital 
charges for hedged exposures one must account for the risks facing both an obligor and a 
guarantor.  As a result, the ASRF capital formula for hedged exposures is a bit more 
complicated than the A-IRB risk-weight function.  It requires that one specify multiple 
asset-correlation parameters, and it depends on the PDs and LGDs associated with both 
counterparties.  
ASRF capital charges for hedged exposures are sensitive to three separate asset-
correlation parameters. The first parameter, ρ o, measures the exposure of the reference 
obligor to the systematic risk factor.  It has exactly the same economic interpretation as 
the asset-correlation parameter that appears in the C&I risk-weight function.  It seems 
reasonable to assume that the risk characteristics of hedged counterparties are no different 
from those of unhedged counterparties, so the calibrations presented here use the CP3 
C&I asset-correlation formula to calculate ρ o. 
                                                 
7 See Pykhtin and Dev (2002) for a similar application to ASRF capital charges for loan-backed securities.   12 
The second correlation parameter, ρ g, measures the exposure of the guarantor to 
systematic risk.  While it is tempting to assume that ρ o and ρ g are the same, there are 
reasons to believe that the sellers of credit protection may tend to have greater exposure 
to systematic risk than typical corporate obligors.  For example, greater diversification 
tends to lower a firm's overall risk of default, but increases the proportion of that risk that 
is systematic.  Thus if credit guarantees are commonly sold by large, well-diversified 
financial institutions we might expect guarantors to have a greater sensitivity to 
systematic risk than is typical for most corporate obligors.  The model derived in the 
appendix is flexible enough to allow for differences in obligor and guarantor asset-
correlation assumptions.  
The third correlation parameter, ρ og, measures the correlation between the assets 
of the obligor and those of the guarantor.  This is the same asset-correlation parameter 
discussed in section 2.  It measures the extent to which the obligor and the guarantor face 
the same sources of credit risk.  Because both counterparties are exposed to the same 
systematic risk factor, there will always be some correlation between their asset values.
8  
However, the model derived in the appendix allows for the possibility of “extra” 
correlation above and beyond that induced by systematic risk.  Such extra correlation is 
often referred to as “wrong way” risk.
9   
For a baseline case, we first consider the capital charges that arise when 
guarantors are assumed to have the same exposure to systematic risk as other corporate 
obligors, and there is no “extra” correlation between the assets of obligors and 
guarantors.  The base case capital charges for a range of obligor and guarantor PDs and 
high and low guarantor LGDs are reported in table 4 (next page).  As mentioned earlier, 
all capital calibrations assume a one-year-maturity loan and an obligor LGD of 45 
percent. The first four rows of table 4 report capital charges under a 100 percent 
guarantor LGD assumption which implies no double-recovery effects.  Comparing these 
charges with those in the first four rows of table 2 reveals that even when double-
                                                 
8 When systematic risk is the only driver of correlation between the assets of the obligor and the guarantor 
ρ og is equal to the geometric mean of ρ o and ρ g.  That is, ρ og = (ρ oρ g)
1/2. 
9 Note that the model explicitly accommodates wrong-way risk in default but not recoveries.  In keeping 
with the CP3 proposed capital treatment for unhedged exposures, all uncertainty associated with recoveries 
are handled implicitly in the definition of the LGD parameters. 13 
recovery effects are not present, recognizing double-default effects can have a vary large 
impact. For low PD obligors the ASRF capital charges can be orders of magnitude lower 
than the substitution approach capital charges.  The dramatic differences in capital 
charges produced by the substitution and ASRF approaches can also be seen in the top 
panel of figure 2 (page 14), which compares ASRF, ISDA haircut, substitution approach, 
and unhedged capital charges given a guarantor with a PD of 1 percent and an LGD of 
100 percent. 
When a 45 percent guarantor LGD assumption is combined with the 45 percent 
obligor LGD assumption to produce an overall LGD of 20.25 percent for a hedged 
exposure, double-recovery effects interact with double-default effects to generate an even 
larger gap between ASRF and substitution approach capital charges.  This can be seen by 
comparing the last four rows of tables 4 and 2 and by examining the bottom panel of 
figure 2.  Both obligor and guarantor LGD parameters enter the ASRF capital formula in 
a multiplicative manner, so lowering the guarantor LGD parameter has the effect of 
reducing the resulting regulatory capital charges by a proportional amount. 
The advanced IRB risk-weight functions for unhedged exposures require banks to 
provide PDs and LGDs, but relies on “hard wired” asset-correlation parameters.  To 
make use of the ASRF formula for hedged exposures, the Basel Committee would need 
to set values for guarantor asset correlation and obligor–guarantor asset-correlation 
parameters, just as they have already done for obligor asset correlations.  The next section 
shows how ASRF capital charges are affected by varying assumptions about ρ g and ρ og.  
 
Table 4: ASRF capital charged given ρ g = ρ irb and ρ og = (ρ oρ g)
1/2 (no wrong-way risk). 
 
Obligor LGD = 45  Guarantor 
Obligor PD 
LGD PD  0.03  0.10  0.50  1.00  2.00 5.00 10.00 50.00 
0.03 0.01  0.02 0.06 0.09 0.12  0.18  0.26 0.54 
0.10 0.02  0.05 0.15 0.22 0.29  0.44  0.63 1.34 
0.50 0.06  0.15 0.43 0.62 0.84  1.25  1.81 3.84 
100 
1.00 0.09  0.22 0.62 0.89 1.20  1.80  2.60 5.51 
0.03 0.00  0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05  0.08  0.12 0.24 
0.10 0.01  0.02 0.07 0.10 0.13  0.20  0.29 0.60 
0.50 0.03  0.07 0.19 0.28 0.38  0.56  0.82 1.73 
45 
1.00 0.04  0.10 0.28 0.40 0.54  0.81  1.17 2.48 14 
Figure 2: Capital charges for hedged exposures under the substitution approach, ISDA’s 
PD haircut approach, and the ASRF approach.  All capital charges assume a 1 percent 
guarantor PD and a 45 percent obligor LGD. 
 




































































4.  Asset Correlations and ASRF Capital Charges 
ASRF capital charges are sensitive to assumptions about the exposure of 
guarantors to systematic risk as well as assumptions about co-movements in the credit 
quality of obligors and guarantors.  This section examines the effects of obligor and 
obligor–guarantor asset-correlation parameters on capital requirements for hedged 
exposures. 
Sensitivity to ρρρρ g  
According to Fitch, Inc. (2003), credit guarantees are most commonly sold by 
large banks and insurance companies.  These types of institutions tend to do a good job 
diversifying away idiosyncratic risk, so we might expect protection sellers to have low 
overall risk (low PDs) but relatively high exposure to systematic risk (high ρ g).  
Tables 5 and 6 (page 17) report capital charges for the same obligor–guarantor 
asset-correlation parameter assumptions used in the base case, but with guarantor asset-
correlation parameters of 50 percent and 75 percent.
10  Figure 3 (page 18) shows the 
effect on capital of increasing the value of ρ g when the guarantor has a one percent 
default probability.  As can be seen from the tables and the figure, capital charges are 
quite sensitive to ρ g.  Increasing the value of this parameter greatly increases the resulting 
capital charges.  Comparing tables 5 and 6 with table 2 shows that capital charges are 
generally significantly lower than those generated by the substitution approach even 
when the guarantor asset correlation is high.  However, when ρ g and the obligor PD are 
both relatively high, ASRF capital charges may exceed those generated by the 
substitution approach.   
To understand how the substitution approach can understate capital charges, it is 
helpful to think about what happens in the limiting case in which the obligor's PD and 
LGD are both 100 percent.  In this setting, all payments to the bank come from the 
guarantor, so the ASRF capital charge is equal to the A-IRB capital charge given the 
                                                 
10 If we assume that systematic risk is the only driver of correlation between an obligor and a guarantor (i.e. 
there is no wrong-way risk), then increasing the value of ρ g has the effect of increasing ρ og (see footnote 8). 
For this reason, when the obligor asset correlation is 0.50 and there is no wrong-way risk, the obligor-
guarantor asset correlation ranges from 0.24 to 0.35 depending on the obligor PD.  When the obligor asset 
correlation is 0.75 the obligor-guarantor asset correlation ranges from 0.30 to 0.42.  16 
guarantor's PD, LGD, and asset correlation.  In contrast, the substitution approach 
calculates capital using the guarantor's PD and LGD but the CP3 asset-correlation 
formula.  Thus, if the guarantor asset correlation exceeds ρ irb, ASRF capital charges will 
be larger than substitution approach capital charges.  More generally, ASRF capital 
charges will tend to exceed those generated by the substitution approach when ρ g  > ρ irb 
and the obligor's PD and LGD are high.  
We seek comment on the appropriate value for the guarantor asset-correlation 
parameter.  Should the CP3 asset-correlation function be used so that guarantors are 
assumed to have the same exposure to systematic risk as obligors? Or should this 
parameter be set more conservatively to reflect the possibility that guarantors tend to 





Table 5: ASRF capital charges given ρ g = 0.50 and ρ og = (ρ oρ g)
1/2 (no wrong-way risk). 
 
Obligor LGD = 45  Guarantor 
Obligor PD 
LGD PD  0.03  0.10  0.50  1.00  2.00 5.00 10.00 50.00 
0.03 0.02  0.06  0.17  0.25  0.33  0.50  0.72  1.53 
0.10 0.06  0.15  0.44  0.63  0.86  1.28  1.86  3.94 
0.50 0.18  0.45  1.28  1.83  2.49  3.72  5.39  11.41 
100 
1.00 0.26  0.65  1.85  2.66  3.60  5.39  7.81  16.53 
0.03 0.01  0.03  0.08  0.11  0.15  0.22  0.33  0.69 
0.10 0.03  0.07  0.20  0.28  0.39  0.58  0.84  1.77 
0.50 0.08  0.20  0.57  0.82  1.12  1.67  2.42  5.13 
45 





Table 6: ASRF capital charges given ρ g = 0.75 and ρ og = (ρ oρ g)
1/2 (no wrong-way risk). 
 
Obligor LGD = 45  Guarantor 
Obligor PD 
LGD PD  0.03  0.10  0.50  1.00  2.00 5.00 10.00 50.00 
0.03 0.04  0.10  0.29  0.41  0.56  0.84  1.21  2.57 
0.10 0.13  0.31  0.90  1.29  1.75  2.61  3.78  8.01 
0.50 0.36  0.89  2.55  3.66  4.96  7.42  10.76  22.77 
100 
1.00 0.47  1.17  3.33  4.78  6.49  9.70  14.07  29.78 
0.03 0.02  0.05  0.13  0.19  0.25  0.38  0.55  1.16 
0.10 0.06  0.14  0.40  0.58  0.79  1.17  1.70  3.60 
0.50 0.16  0.40  1.15  1.65  2.23  3.34  4.84  10.25 
45 
1.00 0.21  0.52  1.50  2.15  2.92  4.37  6.33  13.40 
 18 
Figure 3: ASRF capital charges for hedged exposures under base case (ρ g = ρ irb), mid   
(ρ g = 0.50), and high (ρ g = 0.75) guarantor asset-correlation assumptions.  All 
capital charges assume a 1 percent guarantor PD and a 45 percent obligor LGD. 
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ASRF: High Guar. Corr.19 
Sensitivity to ρρρρ og  
The base case assumes that the only source of common risk between a reference 
obligor and a guarantor is the systematic risk factor that affects all obligors.  In fact, 
however, it is possible that guarantors and obligors may tend to have more in common 
than unrelated obligors.  Protection sellers may specialize in covering risks in particular 
industries or regions, or they may have financial dealings with the obligors whose risks 
they guarantee.  In such cases, the obligor–guarantor asset correlation ρ og would be 
higher than assumed in the base case.  All else equal, higher obligor–guarantor asset 
correlations make joint default more likely so capital charges can be expected to increase 
with ρ og.  
Tables 7 and 8 (next page) and figure 4 (page 21) show the effects of increasing 
the obligor–guarantor asset-correlation assumption on regulatory capital charges.  While 
capital charges are clearly increasing in ρ og, comparing tables 7 and 8 with tables 5 and 6 
reveals that they are much more sensitive to ρ g. 
The ASRF capital formula for hedged exposures is more complex than other 
Basel II risk-weight formulas.  This complexity flows from the need to model wrong-way 
risk between the guarantor and the obligor.  As is shown in the appendix (equation (4)), if 
we assume that there is no wrong-way risk then the ASRF capital formula becomes much 
simpler.  In this setting, the risk weight for a hedged exposure is calculated by simply 
taking the product of the risk weights that would be applied for unhedged exposures to 
the guarantor and the obligor. 
We seek comment on the appropriate value for the obligor–guarantor asset-
correlation parameter.  Is wrong-way risk an important concern for most hedged credit 
transactions?  If so, is dealing with it under Pillar I worth the added complexity?  What 




Table 7: ASRF capital charges given ρ g = ρ irb and ρ og = 0.50. 
 
Obligor LGD = 45  Guarantor 
Obligor PD 
LGD PD  0.03  0.10  0.50  1.00  2.00 5.00 10.00 50.00 
0.03 0.05  0.10 0.21 0.27 0.33  0.42  0.50 0.61 
0.10 0.10  0.20 0.46 0.60 0.75  0.97  1.18 1.52 
0.50 0.21  0.46 1.08 1.44 1.83  2.46  3.10 4.40 
100 
1.00 0.27  0.60 1.44 1.93 2.48  3.36  4.29 6.15 
0.03 0.02  0.04 0.09 0.12 0.15  0.19  0.23 0.28 
0.10 0.04  0.09 0.20 0.27 0.34  0.44  0.53 0.68 
0.50 0.09  0.20 0.48 0.65 0.82  1.11  1.39 1.94 
45 





Table 8: ASRF capital charges given ρ g = ρ irb and ρ og = 0.75. 
 
Obligor LGD = 45  Guarantor 
Obligor PD 
LGD PD  0.03  0.10  0.50  1.00  2.00 5.00 10.00 50.00 
0.03 0.16  0.28 0.44 0.50 0.55  0.59  0.61 0.62 
0.10 0.28  0.51 0.93 1.10 1.24  1.40  1.49 1.54 
0.50 0.44  0.93 1.98 2.48 2.95  3.57  4.02 4.40 
100 
1.00 0.50  1.10 2.48 3.18 3.86  4.81  5.57 6.30 
0.03 0.07  0.12 0.20 0.23 0.25  0.27  0.27 0.28 
0.10 0.12  0.23 0.42 0.49 0.56  0.63  0.67 0.69 
0.50 0.20  0.42 0.89 1.12 1.33  1.61  1.81 1.98 
45 
1.00 0.23  0.49 1.12 1.43 1.74  2.16  2.51 2.84 21 
Figure 4: ASRF capital charges for hedged exposures under base case (ρ og = ρ irb), mid 
(ρ og = 0.50), and high (ρ og = 0.75) obligor–guarantor asset-correlation 
assumptions.  All capital charges assume a 1 percent guarantor PD and a 45 
percent obligor LGD. 
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5. Supervisory  Concerns 
Full recognition of double-default and double-recovery effects under Pillar I could 
have important implications for the supervision of banks under Pillar II.  This section 
discusses and seeks comment on these supervisory issues. 
Excessive Concentration to Hedged Counterparties 
One of the main reasons banks use credit guarantees is to reduce credit risks to 
obligors with whom they have exceptionally large exposures. In some cases, guarantees 
enable banks to make credit extensions that exceed in-house single-borrower limits. 
However, Pillar I capital charges are intended to cover the credit risk of a well-diversified 
loan portfolio; they do not cover the additional risk that would arise if a bank's exposures 
were concentrated among a relatively small number of counterparties. 
An ideal regulatory capital framework would capture concentration risk (that is, 
risk arising from a lack of granularity in a bank's portfolio) in addition to credit risk 
arising from systematic shocks.  The Basel Committee is well aware of the risks 
associated with lack of granularity.  The Committee in fact proposed a so-called 
“granularity adjustment” in the second consultative paper (CP2), which was subsequently 
abandoned because of its complexity and because its effects on capital charges were not 
believed to be of material importance for large, internationally active banks.  As a result, 
under the current Basel II proposal, concentration risk is not explicitly addressed under 
Pillar I but rather is dealt with as a supervisory matter under Pillar II.  Under Pillar II, an 
A-IRB bank that does not have a loan portfolio that is well diversified across geographic 
areas, across industries, and across names can be required to hold a larger capital buffer 
in excess of Pillar I minimums than a more diversified institution. 
A potential side effect of granting substantial capital relief for credit guarantees 
under Pillar I is that supervisors would need to more closely monitor bank portfolio 
concentrations for Pillar II purposes.  In principle, a credit guarantee can reduce both the 
systematic component of credit risk covered under Pillar I and the idiosyncratic risk 
arising from poor portfolio diversification covered under Pillar II.  In practice, 
supervisors have no reliable means of quantifying the latter effect.  If double-default and 23 
double-recovery effects are not recognized under Pillar I then supervisors are reasonably 
comfortable with the view that for purposes of identifying portfolio credit risk 
concentrations, a hedged exposure can be treated as an exposure to the guarantor.  This 
view may well overstate the concentration-risk-mitigating effects of credit guarantees for 
large exposures, but conservatism in the treatment of hedged exposures under Pillar I 
permits supervisors a measure of flexibility in dealing with them under Pillar II.  On the 
other hand, if substantial capital relief were to be granted for hedged exposures under 
Pillar I, a more accurate assessment of the effects of credit guarantees on concentration 
risk would be warranted.   No consensus exists among supervisors or within the banking 
industry regarding how concentration risk should be measured, let alone how it should 
translate into regulatory capital requirements. 
Furthermore, the market for credit derivatives is currently dominated by a 
relatively small number of dealers (see section 6).  Given that granting substantial capital 
relief for guarantees under Pillar I would likely encourage banks to make more intensive 
use of credit derivatives, supervisors are concerned that without effective systems for 
monitoring both single-name and industry portfolio concentrations, banks might tend to 
substitute concentrations to individual large obligors with concentrations to the 
derivatives-dealer industry.    
Comments are solicited concerning whether recognizing double-default and 
double-recovery effects is appropriate in the context of the “well diversified” assumption 
underlying Basel II's Pillar I.  Comment is also sought on how banks’ internal 
management systems currently deal with double-default and double-recovery effects for 
both internal credit risk rating and the management of exposure limits and how banks 
envision the future evolution of these systems.  Supervisors are also interested in industry 
views on ways to assess exposure concentrations in the event that double-default and 
double-recovery effects are recognized under Pillar I.  
Scope of Application 
Much of the discussion relating to double-default effects in this paper focuses 
implicitly or explicitly on credit protection provided in arms-length transactions by third 
parties such as derivatives dealers.  It is important to recognize, however, that, in theory, 24 
double-default and double-recovery effects could arise in a broad range of common 
financial transactions including, for example, two-name paper, bankers’ acceptances, and 
mortgages carrying private mortgage insurance.  Any concrete proposal for providing 
capital relief in recognition of double-default and double-recovery effects must therefore 
set standards for the types of financial transactions that would be covered.  A guiding 
principle for such standards should be identifying and carving out those transactions 
involving excessive wrong-way risk. 
In the context of credit guarantees, wrong-way risk refers to a situation in which 
risks to the reference obligor are highly correlated with those to the protection provider.  
Wrong-way risk manifested itself during the Russian debt crisis because U.S. banks had 
hedged their credit exposure to Russian companies with Russian banks.  As the 
companies deteriorated, so did the banks, and the value of the hedges were nearly 
worthless.  Different types of guaranteed transactions clearly involve different degrees of 
wrong-way risk.  For example, wrong-way risk is probably particularly significant for the 
two-name paper contracts that large companies frequently use to guarantee loans to their 
suppliers. 
As demonstrated in section 2, wrong-way risk attenuates the benefits of double-
default and double-recovery effects.  In principle, the ASRF model developed in sections 
3 and 4 can capture wrong-way risk through the obligor–guarantor asset-correlation 
parameter (ρ og).  In practice, however, banks are unlikely to be able to provide estimates 
for this parameter that could be validated by supervisors.  For this reason, implementing 
something akin to the ASRF approach to recognizing double-default effects would almost 
certainly require that an obligor–guarantor correlation parameter be “hard wired” to 
reflect the average level of wrong-way risk for hedged transactions.  Such an approach 
could seriously understate the regulatory capital needed to cover credit risk for 
transactions that involve an exceptionally high degree of wrong-way risk. 
Thus, if double-default effects were recognized, the Basel Committee would need 
to find a way to identify and carve out wrong-way trades that should not be eligible for 
capital relief beyond the substitution approach.  In addition, the Committee would need to 
ensure that it did not create an incentive for banks to purchase relatively cheap credit 
derivatives from protection providers whose risks are highly correlated with those of 25 
reference obligors.  The staff would like interested parties to comment on what types of 
financial transactions they believe should be eligible for capital relief associated with 
double-default effects, and what types of transactions should be excluded.  Comments 
should focus on identifying those types of financial transactions for which excessive 
wrong-way risk is a particular concern. 
More generally, staff is interested in industry views on how best to incorporate 
wrong-way risk into a regulatory capital approach that recognizes double-default effects.  
Could this be done within a Pillar I framework or should identification of wrong-way risk 
be addressed under Pillar II?  Supervisors have concerns with a purely Pillar II based 
treatment, as the volume of loans guaranteed by parties with a relationship to the 
reference obligor could be very large.  Ensuring that banks do not receive capital 
recognition for double-default effects on transactions that entail significant wrong-way 
risk could potentially require a level of supervisory scrutiny that might not be practical. 
An additional issue involves the effect that recognition of double-default and 
double-recovery effects may have on incentives for shifting exposures from the banking 
book to the trading book and the potential for such shifts to give rise to capital arbitrage.  
Incentives for shifting credit exposures from the banking book to the trading book arise 
primarily from differences in regulatory capital treatment.  As discussed in paragraphs 
642 though 647 of CP3, trading book exposures that are actively managed and marked to 
market at least daily will continue to be subject to the 1996 Market Risk Amendment 
(MRA) to the 1988 Basel Accord.  In light of the active management and daily 
revaluation of positions, capital charges for credit risk exposures under the MRA are 
generally smaller than those computed for similar instruments held in the banking book.  
The new definition of trading exposures subject to the MRA contemplates segmentation 
and A-IRB corporate capital treatment of any credit exposures that may be held in the 
trading book but are not actively managed and thus not subject to the MRA.  Similarly, 
any credit derivative positions held in the trading book that hedge banking book 
exposures would also be subject to A-IRB treatment, although current regulatory 
reporting instructions require such positions (which are considered not held for trading 
purposes) to be reported as “Other Assets” in the banking book. 26 
Staff would like comments from interested parties on whether significant potential 
for capital arbitrage exists due to the different capital treatments of MRA trading 
exposures and A-IRB exposures and whether recognition of double-default and double-
recovery effects might amplify incentives for any such arbitrage.   Consider the situation 
illustrated in figure 5 (above).  In this example, a bank makes a loan to a reference 
obligor.  If the bank buys credit protection via a default swap on the reference obligor it 
can reduce its exposure to the borrower.  However, assume that the bank simultaneously 
sells protection or already holds an equivalent swap to the very same guarantor or buys a 
bond or grants an additional loan to the reference obligor.   The net result is that the bank 
is left with a credit exposure to the same reference obligor.    If this credit exposure is 
subject to the lower MRA capital charge because it is held in an actively managed trading 
account, concerns over the potential for capital arbitrage may arise since the bank might 
receive a lower combined regulatory capital charge for the set of transactions than would 
Figure 5: Potential capital arbitrage using countervailing credit guarantees.  




















be required for an unhedged loan to the reference obligor.  By lowering the capital 
charges for hedged loans more than that available using the substitution approach, 
recognizing double-default effects could increase incentives for this sort of regulatory 
capital arbitrage. 
Staff would like comments on how such capital arbitrage might be prevented.  In 
particular, if the Basel Committee chose to recognize double-default and double-recovery 
effects under Pillar I, would it need to restrict capital relief to those hedges that are not 
undone by countervailing, albeit actively managed, trading book exposures such as those 
held in dealer inventories or as proprietary trading positions?  More importantly, is it 
inappropriate to have different regulatory capital regimes for actively managed, marked 
to market trading account credit exposures, and non-actively managed trading book and 
banking book credit exposures?  Does the existence of such differences give rise to 
significant capital arbitrage issues? 
6.  Is the Market Ready? 
Though the market for credit derivatives has grown dramatically over the last 
several years, it is still relatively nascent.  Because this market appears to be highly 
concentrated, supervisors are concerned that if banks rely heavily on credit derivatives to 
mitigate credit risk, concentration risk could increase.  Furthermore, the staff is not aware 
of any empirical evidence quantifying the value that market participants place on double-
default and recovery effects.  This section seeks comment on these issues. 
Concentration in Credit Derivatives Markets 
Currently, about a dozen global commercial and investment banks dominate the 
credit derivatives market as intermediaries.  Banks hedging their exposures on loans 
typically purchase protection from these dealers.  Dealers (which include banks and 
securities firms) often lay risk off with other dealers or with end-users such as insurance 
and reinsurance companies and financial guarantors.  Concentration in the dealer market 
may create concentrations of counterparty credit risk for those banks that purchase credit 
protection as well as for the dealers themselves. To the extent that dealers frequently lay 28 
risk off with a small number of end-users in the insurance industry or any other industry 
the dealers may also have industry risk concentrations.  
Banks have a number of mechanisms open to them for managing the counterparty 
risks associated with credit derivative transactions.  For example banks routinely 
negotiate master netting agreements with counterparties with whom they frequently 
transact.  Under such an agreement, if a counterparty should default, positions with that 
counterparty can be terminated and gains and losses netted out.  Banks may also enter 
into collateral agreements requiring their counterparties to post collateral if their net 
credit exposure exceeds a negotiated threshold. The threshold often shrinks as the 
counterparty’s credit rating declines. 
Comments are solicited on whether and to what extent concentrations among 
dealers and among guarantors might contribute to portfolio-level risk at large, 
internationally active banks.  How do banks manage the increased exposure to market 
liquidity risk that results from active hedging with credit derivatives? Can interested 
parties provide data on the overall level of concentration among protection sellers?  What 
information do dealer banks currently use to manage concentration risk among protection 
sellers? To what extent can master netting agreements, collateral agreements, and other 
contractual arrangements mitigate counterparty risk in credit derivative transactions? 
In the ASRF model presented in sections 3 and 4 the guarantor asset-correlation 
parameter ρ g can be interpreted as a measure of the interdependence among risks facing 
guarantors.  Should extra conservatism be used in calibrating this parameter to reflect 
concerns about guarantor concentrations?  Is this sufficient? 
It is not clear whether moving from the substitution approach to something like 
the ASRF approach would tend to encourage or discourage greater concentration among 
dealers.  The substitution approach proposed in CP3 would only permit a reduction in 
capital when guarantees are provided by very safe (low PD) protection sellers.  By 
favoring a narrow class of guarantors and permitting no capital relief for protection 
provided by other potential guarantors, the substitution approach could tend to encourage 
greater concentration in the dealer market.  The calibration presented in sections 3 and 4 
indicate that the ASRF approach would likely lead to a substantial reduction in capital 
requirements for most types of hedged transactions.  Naturally, this approach provides 29 
more favorable capital treatment for exposures guaranteed by high quality protection 
sellers, but it does not contain an embedded “cliff effect” like that inherent in the 
substitution approach.  Thus, while recognizing double-default and double-recovery 
effects could be expected to stimulate demand for credit protection broadly, it is unclear 
what effect such a policy would have on dealer concentrations.  Industry views on this 
matter are solicited.    
Market Recognition of Double-Default and Double-Recovery Effects 
If market participants with money at risk endorse the conceptual logic of double-
default and double-recovery effects, one would expect to see these effects reflected in the 
market pricing of guaranteed debt instruments.  For example, all else equal, debt to an 
obligor with a given rating should trade at a higher spread than comparable debt that is 
guaranteed by a protection seller with the same rating.   Information on the spreads paid 
on two-name paper, bankers’ acceptances, collateralized debt obligations, and other 
publicly traded guaranteed debt instruments could help to quantify the value market 
participants place on double-default and recovery effects. 
To date, the staff has been unable to quantify pecuniary benefits from double-
default and double-recovery effects.  If the market cannot be shown to value these effects, 
recognition of them for capital purposes would place supervisors in the position of 
endorsing an economic view of risk that is not held by the market in practice.  
Accordingly the staff requests that market participants present empirical analysis showing 
whether and to what extent participants are willing to pay in order to obtain the risk-
mitigating benefits associated with double-default and double-recovery effects.  Ideally, 
such analysis should go beyond simply quoting market prices for various types of credit 
guarantees.  It should provide apples-to-apples comparisons of the transaction prices of 
debt instruments with and without double-default and double-recovery effects.  The staff 
also seeks comments from both buyers and sellers of credit protection regarding how they 
deal with double-default and double-recovery effects in their own internal risk 
management, capital allocation, and pricing systems.   30 
7. Conclusion 
Table 9 (below) reports ASRF capital charges under conservative assumptions for 
both guarantor and obligor–guarantor asset correlations.  For most obligor and guarantor 
PD combinations, these ASRF capital charges are a great deal lower than those produced 
by the substitution approach. Table 10 (next page) gives a sense of the likely effects of 
using the substitution approach, ISDA’s PD haircut approach, and the ASRF approach 
given typical reference obligor PDs.  It reports average capital charges per dollar 
exposure for an equally weighted portfolio of the top seventeen most commonly hedged 
U.S. reference obligors according to Fitch, Inc. (2003).  All are large corporations with 
middle to low investment-grade ratings.  PDs for these obligors are derived from long-run 
S&P-grade default frequencies, and each obligor is assumed to have an LGD of 45 
percent.  For this portfolio, the substitution approach yields a significant reduction in 
capital only when guarantor PDs and LGDs are quite low.  For higher-PD guarantors, the 
substitution approach actually conveys no reduction in capital.  In contrast, the ASRF 
approach yields significant capital reductions for the full range of guarantor PD and LGD 
values considered.  When the guarantor PD is very small (3 basis points), average ASRF 
capital charges are an order of magnitude lower than those generated by the substitution 
approach. 
 
Table 9: ASRF capital charges given ρ g = 0.50 and ρ og = 0.50. 
 
Obligor LGD = 45  Guarantor 
Obligor PD 
LGD PD  0.03  0.10  0.50  1.00  2.00 5.00 10.00 50.00 
0.03 0.08  0.17 0.41 0.57 0.76  1.05  1.30 1.72 
0.10 0.16  0.36 0.91 1.27 1.70  2.41  3.09 4.39 
0.50 0.33  0.78 2.08 2.95 3.99  5.81  7.79  12.47 
100 
1.00 0.42  1.00 2.71 3.86 5.24  7.69  10.53  17.86 
0.03 0.03  0.08 0.19 0.26 0.34  0.47  0.59 0.78 
0.10 0.07  0.16 0.41 0.57 0.77  1.09  1.39 1.98 
0.50 0.15  0.35 0.94 1.33 1.79  2.61  3.50 5.61 
45 
1.00 0.19  0.45 1.22 1.74 2.36  3.46  4.74 8.04 
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Table 10: Average capital charge per dollar exposure for a portfolio of commonly 












0.03  1.34 1.04 0.73 0.15 
0.10  1.34 1.34 0.85 0.31 
0.50  1.34 1.34 0.85 0.68 
100 
1.00  1.34 1.34 0.85 0.87 
0.03  1.34 0.62 0.41 0.07 
0.10  1.34 1.13 0.71 0.14 
0.50  1.34 1.34 0.85 0.31 
45 
1.00  1.34 1.34 0.85 0.39 
*Assumes ρ g = 0.50 and ρ og = 0.50. 
 
Clearly, capital charges for hedged exposures derived under the ASRF approach 
look very different from those produced by the substitution approach.  When we ask the 
narrow question, “Does the substitution approach produce Pillar I capital charges that are 
consistent with those applied to unhedged exposures?” the answer appears to be “No.”  A 
guiding principle underlying the development of Basel II is that regulatory capital 
charges should reflect underlying risks.  In this spirit, the Basel Committee may wish to 
consider implementing a more risk-sensitive Pillar I capital treatment for hedged 
exposures along the lines described in section 3 and the appendix. 
However, if the Basel Committee were to consider implementing an approach 
similar to the one developed in this paper, three important practical issues would need to 
be addressed. First, under plausible parameter assumptions, the ASRF approach would 
lead to exceptionally low capital charges on low-PD exposures guaranteed by low-PD 
protection sellers, as table 10 clearly demonstrates.  To prevent banks from operating 
with unacceptably high leverage, the Basel Committee would almost certainly wish to 
impose a floor on ASRF risk weights for hedged exposures.  Industry comments are 
solicited on where such a floor should be set. 
 Second, applying the ASRF approach would require that supervisors take a stand 
on assumed values for guarantor asset correlations and obligor–guarantor asset 
correlations, just as they have already done for obligor asset correlations.  Very little 
public data exists with which to calibrate these parameters. Supervisors have doubts 32 
about whether they can be estimated accurately and about whether they can be expected 
to remain stable during times of economic stress.  The staff would appreciate any data or 
analysis that industry can provide concerning the appropriate values for guarantor asset-
correlation parameters and obligor–guarantor asset-correlation parameters. Furthermore, 
the staff would like to know whether market participants expect these parameters to 
remain stable over time. 
Third, the ASRF capital formula derived in the appendix is more complex than 
other A-IRB risk-weight formulas because it relies on three asset-correlation parameters 
rather than one, and it requires that a bivariate normal cumulative distribution function be 
evaluated.  Given the Basel Committee's expressed desire to simplify the new accord and 
supervisors’ concerns about explicitly introducing additional correlation assumptions, the 
Committee may wish to consider a less mathematically complex capital treatment.  As 
shown in the appendix, a reasonable compromise between realism and simplicity might 
be to apply a haircut to the A-IRB risk weight (not the PD) for the unhedged exposure. 
The haircut would depend on the PD and LGD of the guarantor but would be no more 
difficult to calculate than existing A-IRB risk weights.  ISDA has proposed that a haircut 
be applied to the minimum of the obligor and guarantor PDs, but the analysis presented in 
this paper suggests that applying a haircut to the risk weight for an unhedged exposure 
would be more appropriate.  The staff would appreciate comment from interested parties 
concerning how such a haircut might be structured. 
In determining whether or not to recognize double-default and double-recovery 
effects, the Basel Committee will need to look beyond the narrow question of whether 
Pillar I should handle capital for hedged and unhedged exposures in a more internally 
consistent manner.  By lowering Pillar I capital charges on hedged exposures, 
recognizing double-default and double-recovery effects may well increase the need for 
supervisory oversight under Pillar II.  We seek comment from interested parties on the 
following areas of particular supervisor concern. 
 
•  Pillar I capital charges do not cover concentration risk, but banks commonly use 
guarantees to hedge risk to counterparties with whom they have large exposures.  
If credit-risk mitigation arising from guarantees is fully recognized under Pillar I, 33 
will portfolio concentrations be harder to deal with under Pillar II?   What 
standards should be set to ensure that banks that rely heavily on credit guarantees 
are adequately managing exposure concentrations? 
•  What can be done to ensure that banks do not receive capital relief for hedge 
transactions that entail excessive wrong-way risk?  Under CP3, banks must 
demonstrate that protection sellers operate at arms length from reference obligors 
to be eligible to use the substitution approach.  However, as the experience of 
banks during the Russian ruble crisis makes clear, this requirement does not 
completely address the potential for wrong-way risk.  What additional operational 
standards might be needed to prevent wrong-way transactions if double-default 
and double-recovery effects are recognized?   
•  Will banks be able to arbitrage regulatory capital charges by shifting credit 
guarantees between banking and trading books?  Would such incentives be 
strengthened or weakened if double-default and double-recovery effects were 
recognized?  What could be done to limit incentives for capital arbitrage? 
 
Finally, it is fair to say that bank supervisors know less about the credit guarantee 
market than they would like. What limited data exists indicate that a few large dealers are 
involved in a large share of credit derivatives transactions.  Information from parties that 
actively use credit guarantees would help the Basel Committee to make a more informed 
decision concerning whether and to what extent double-default and double-recovery 
effects should be recognized.  Answers to the following questions would be particularly 
helpful. 
 
•  Is concentration among dealers of credit derivatives a cause for supervisory 
concern?  By encouraging banks to rely more heavily on credit derivatives to 
hedge credit risk, would recognizing double-default and double-recovery effects 
create greater concentration risk? 
•  Who ultimately holds the risk associated with credit guarantees?  Is a significant 
share of credit risk transferred outside the banking industry as a whole, or do 
banks simply swap risks with one another?  How concentrated is the pool of 34 
protection sellers?  How do banks manage concentrations to protection sellers?  
How useful are collateral agreements and master netting agreements in this 
regard? 
•  What evidence can be brought to bear on how the market views double-default 
and recovery effects?  How do banks deal with these effects when evaluating 
economic capital? 
 
More generally, commenters are asked to provide evidence and analysis that can address 
concerns about the systemic effects of significantly reducing capital charges on exposures 
hedged with credit derivatives and financial guarantees.  35 
Appendix 
This appendix discusses joint default probabilities, ASRF capital charges, a 
simplified ASRF formula, and the substitution approach.  Throughout this appendix the 
subscript “o” denotes the obligor, and the subscript “g” denotes the guarantor.  The 
subscript “i” is used when variables may refer to any counterparty. 
Joint Default Probabilities 
The ASRF approach to calculating capital charges for hedged exposures makes 
use of the same one-period, Merton-style default model used to derive the Basel II C&I 
risk-weight function.  Let Yi denote the appropriately normalized asset value for 
counterparty i at a one-year assessment horizon, and assume 
   i i i i i 1 U X Y ρ − + ρ =  
where X is a systematic risk factor and Ui is a risk factor specific to counterparty i that is 
uncorrelated with X. Counterparty i defaults if Yi falls below a fixed threshold γ i.  If X 
and Ui are both standard normal random variables, then by construction Yi is also 
standard normal, and the marginal default probability of counterparty i is simply 
   () i i PD γ Φ =  
where Φ (x) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  Since the normal 
CDF has a well-defined inverse function, if PDi is known γ i can be calculated using the 
formula γ i  = Φ
-1(PDi). 
In the standard single-risk-factor model, the counterparty-specific risk factor Ui is 
assumed to be independent across counterparties. However, to capture the possibility that 
an obligor and a guarantor may be more closely related than a pair of unrelated obligors 
one must introduce a second risk factor that affects only the obligor and the guarantor, 
but not other exposures in a lender's portfolio.  Assume 
   i i i i 1 E Z U ψ − + ψ =  
where Ei is independent across all counterparties, but Z is shared by both the obligor and 
the guarantor.  Ei and Z are both standard normal random variables.  By assumption, Z is 36 
not a systematic risk factor because it only affects outcomes for a single obligor and a 
single guarantor. 
This specification implies that the asset correlation measuring the exposure of 
obligor i to systematic risk is 
   [] i i X , Y Cor ρ =  
The obligor–guarantor asset correlation that captures the extent to which the credit 
quality of the two counterparties moves together is given by 
   [] () ()og g o g o g o 1 1 Y , Y Cor ρ ≡ ρ − ρ − ψ + ρ ρ = . 
Notice that when ψ  = 0, the second term in the correlation formula drops out. In this 
special case, the correlation between the obligor's and the guarantor's asset values are 
determined solely by each counterparty's exposure to the systematic risk factor.  More 
generally, ρ og is increasing in ψ . 
The joint probability that both the obligor and the guarantor default is given by 




og ; PD , PD F JPD ρ Φ Φ =
− −  
where F(x1,x2;r) is the bivariate CDF for a pair of standard normal random variables with 
correlation r.  Equation (1) is used to calculate the joint default probabilities reported in 
section 2. 
  Equation (1) is derived under the assumption that assets for the obligor and the 
guarantor are jointly normally distributed, but richer joint probability specification using 
copula models could also be used.  See Embrechts, Klüppelberg, and Mikosch (1997) for 
a discussion of this broader class of models. 
ASRF Capital Charges 
Gordy (2002) shows that given an infinitely-fine-grained portfolio of exposures of 
the sort described above, a decentralized approach to calculating economic capital is 
possible. To achieve a portfolio solvency probability target q one need only plug the  
1-q percentile of X into the conditional expected loss function for each exposure. 
For simplicity, assume that recoveries are fixed so that LGDi is the loss given 
default associated with an exposure to counterparty i, The conditional expected loss 
























γ < ρ − + ρ =
−  
Plugging X = Xq ≡  -Φ
-1(0.999),  the 0.1th quantile of X, into ci(X) yields a capital charge 
for exposure i calibrated to a 99.9 percent portfolio solvency target: 
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This calculation is the basis of the A-IRB C&I risk-weight function.
11 


































γ < ρ − + ρ ∩ γ < ρ − + ρ =
− −  
Using the definition of ρ og given above, we can rewrite cog(X) in terms of the three asset-
correlation parameters ρ o, ρ g, and ρ og.  Plugging X = Xq into this function yields the 
ASRF capital charge for a hedged exposure: 
(3) 
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() () g o 1 1 1
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ρ − ρ −
ρ ρ − ρ
ρ −
ρ Φ + Φ
ρ −
ρ Φ + Φ
− −  
This is the formula used to calculate the ASRF capital charges reported in sections 3 and 
4. 
A Simplified ASRF Formula 
  If one is willing to assume that there is no “extra” correlation between the assets 
of the obligor and the guarantor beyond that generated by both counterparties’ exposures 
to the systematic risk factor, then calculating the ASRF capital charge for hedged 
transactions becomes much easier. When ψ  = 0, defaults by the obligor and the guarantor 
are conditionally independent given X, so equation (3) simplifies to 
                                                 
11 Note that the capital formula used in CP3 includes a maturity adjustment term that drops out for the one-
year maturity loans analyzed here. 38 
(4) 
( )
























ρ Φ + Φ
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g 1
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Thus, the capital charge for the hedged exposure is simply the product of the capital 
charges for unhedged exposures to the obligor and the guarantor.  Viewed from another 
perspective, the capital charge for a hedged exposure can be calculated by simply 
applying a “haircut” of 1 - kU(PDg,LGDg) to the capital charge for the unhedged 
exposure.  The critical difference between this approach and ISDA’s haircut proposal is 
that under this approach the haircut would be applied to the unhedged exposure risk 
weight, not the minimum of the obligor and guarantor PDs. 
The Substitution Approach 
When ψ  = 1, Uo and Ug collapse to a single variable, and the conditional expected 
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Thus the ASRF approach to calculating capital charges for hedged exposures yields the 
substitution approach if we assume that (1) both the obligor and the guarantor have the 
same exposure to the systematic risk factor, (2) asset values of the obligor and the 
guarantor are perfectly correlated, and (3) the LGD associated with the higher PD 
counterparty is 100 percent.  39 
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